My research interests center on culture and political economy of development. My dissertation explains why non-democratic regimes persistently underinvest in the institutions that support the rule of law, and it traces the cause to political and economic concentration with causal data evidence.
Using historical and contemporary data, my current agenda studies the interplay between competition and institutional development: under what conditions competition among individuals, families, and firms is productive; when it turns into wasteful overcompetition (e.g., overeducation, overproduction, and fertility decline); what drives that shift; and what institutional consequences follow. I am particularly interested in identifying the cultural elements of family institutions that shape the evolution of institutions beyond the family, such as kinship lineages, limited-liability corporations, and political regimes.
I welcome conversations with scholars who share these interests about potential collaborations to develop this agenda.
Campus address:
Department of Economics, James Madison University
421 Bluestone Drive, Harrisonburg, VA 22807